Prior to the late fifteenth century in Florence, the losers of political conflicts routinely faced exile as punishment for their perceived crimes. Following the Pazzi conspiracy of 1478, however, such political criminals increasingly received death sentences rather than banishment. This article explores how the changing nature of punishment for political crimes in Renaissance Florence from the fifteenth to the sixteenth centuries can be read as a barometer of political change in the city. It examines the relationship between the growing number of political executions and the long transformation of Florence from a republic to a principality, with reference to the broader context of fifteenth-and sixteenth
O n 21 August 1497 the Florentine government executed five men, in haste and at night: Bernardo del Nero, Niccolò Ridolfi, Lorenzo Tornabuoni, Giannozzo Pucci, and Bernardo Cambi. The apothecary and insatiable recorder of gossip Luca Landucci (1436 Landucci ( -1516 wrote that ''all Florence'' was shocked by their deaths, and that the passage of Tornabuoni's body by his shop on its way to burial occurred ''not without my tears. '' 1 The five had received death sentences for plotting to restore Piero di Lorenzo de ' Medici (1471 ' Medici ( -1503 to the city. Piero and his brothers, the heirs of Lorenzo il Magnifico (1449-92), had fled Florence in November 1494, following a coup that had ended their family's domination of the republic. The expulsion of the Medici received broad approbation across the city: most of the family's closest allies supported it. Landucci recalled that the selection of a new executive in December 1494, the first chosen without Medicean political controls in decades, was met ''with sweet happiness, seeming a accession of Cosimo I (1519-74) in 1537. Studies that examine Florence in the first half of the sixteenth century as a continuum, rather than as composed of two discrete periods, remain very rare. As a result, the question of how the republic transformed into its own political antithesis has remained, until very recently, largely unaddressed. 5 On the one hand, the answer appears very clear: the institutional changes wrought by the constitution of 1532, which abolished the Signoria -the executive governing body of the city since the late thirteenth centuryand which gave Alessandro de ' Medici (ca. 1510-37 ) the vaguely oxymoronic title of Duke of the Florentine Republic, can be tracked easily. 6 The dissolution of the Signoria spelled the symbolic, as well as the practical, end of the republican constitution. For two-and-a-half centuries, it had stood at the pinnacle of the city's government, and membership in it had represented the highest honor for the office-holding class.
7 But the political sphere does not consist solely of institutions. The centrality of culture to political experience, of values and expectations, of the meanings attached to institutions, has become central to historical analysis over the past generation. This has particular importance for studying periods of political transition, because such changes -for example, from a republic to a monarchy -cannot simply be imposed on the politically active classes of any society: such shifts occur by negotiation and dialogue, by consensus and compromise. 8 Changes in political institutions and organizations necessitate shifts in the values and expectations of the participants within the same.
In Florence, the creation of the principality did not happen without the participation of the office-holding class. Explaining how and why the city's elite citizens, who had governed the city for over two centuries, surrendered their predominance to become courtiers and subjects is a more difficult question to answer. How can historians measure changes in values and 5 See Baker. Intellectual historians have tended to study the period between 1494 and the mid-sixteenth century as a continuum: for examples, see Albertini; Gilbert; Jurdjevic. The other significant works on the social and political history of the end of the republic and the creation of the principality follow the artificial historiographical division discussed above: Anzilotti; Berner; Diaz; Litchfield; Stephens; a notable exception is Polizzotto. On the period from 1494 to 1527, see also Bertelli, 1969 and 1971; Butters, 1985 and Cooper, 1978 Cooper, , 1985 Cooper, , 1987 Cooper, , 1988 Cooper, , and 2002 Jones. 6 Archivio di Stato, Firenze (hereafter ASF), Senato de' 48, Provvisioni, 1:1 v -4 v . 7 Guicciardini, 1926, 146-47 , who participated in the committee set up to change the Florentine constitution, observed in a letter written on 16 April 1532: ''nor could there be at Florence any change almost as great as removing the Signoria, which has endured almost 300 years. '' 8 For two examples from diverse historical settings, see Fritzsche; Shagan.
expectations? What metrics exist for political culture? The increasing incidence of political executions in Florence from the late fifteenth century provides one kind of measure. 9 The growing preference for the elimination of political opponents within the office-holding class demonstrates a marked shift in political values and expectations and in the understanding of what the Florentine state was.
According to the registers kept by the Compagnia de' Neri -the confraternity that comforted condemned criminals and accompanied them to their deaths -from 1480 to 1560, sixty-two men from the Florentine office-holding class were executed within the city and its territory for identifiably political reasons. 10 In most cases the Compagnia recorded the reason for the sentence simply as per lo stato, for reasons of state.
11 This brief formulaic phrase captures precisely the political motivation for the judicial killing: the victim of the condemned's crime was not any individual or corporate group, but the state of Florence itself. The brevity of the description stands in contrast to the narrative summaries that detail the crimes of the more prosaic criminals in the Compagnia's records.
On fifty-two occasions these political executions were carried out by beheading the condemned. The remaining ten men were hanged. As with Tornabuoni and his co-conspirators, their deaths -whether by decapitation or hanging -commonly occurred out of public sight, usually in the 9 The inspiration for this argument lies in Evans, who examines capital punishment for all crimes, but whose perceptive arguments about the relationship between political culture and state-sanctioned killing prompted this essay: see especially 872-75. A growing body of historical literature examines the politicocultural contexts of capital punishment in early modern Europe: see Edgerton; Gatrell; McGowen; Merback; Ruggiero, 1994; Sharpe; Spierenburg; Zorzi, 1993 and . Cohn analyzes the relationship between criminal prosecution and the changing nature of the Florentine state in the fourteenth century. 10 See the Appendix below at pp. 471-73. 11 Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale, Firenze (hereafter BNCF), Palatino, 454:7 v -10 v ; Rondini. These numbers should be treated with a degree of caution: the two redactions do not agree completely because of errors in transcription. The original record kept by the Compagnia was damaged beyond repair by a flood on 13 September 1557. The confraternity immediately furnished a copy, which was incomplete because of the state of the original. All extant copies of the Compagnia's list of executed prisoners prior to 1557 are incomplete and their contents vary: see Zorzi, 1993, 160-62; Luttazzi Gregori, 28-41 courtyard of the Bargello, the palace of the police official of the same name. The Compagnia de' Neri recorded thirty political executions at this location. Four occurred outside of Florence: three in Pisa and one in Livorno (the latter, again, within a fortress). Only fifteen of the deaths have public places of execution listed. Among these, only the would-be parricide, Giuliano Buonaccorsi, died at the usual place of execution for all criminals, the Pratello di giustizia, outside the city walls. The remaining fourteen men died in the center of the city, most of them in the Piazza Sant'Apollinare (today the Piazza San Firenze) directly adjacent to the Bargello. On thirteen occasions the Compagnia did not provide a record of the place of death.
While not unknown, the execution of political prisoners had rarely occurred prior to the final quarter of the fifteenth century. Six men were executed in the struggle between the Albizzi and the Alberti at the beginning of the fifteenth century. 12 The struggle between the Albizzi and the Medici in the early 1430s, however, as well as the conflicts in the 1450s and 1460s within the Medicean oligarchy, remained remarkably bloodless: the losing sides in these struggles faced exile, fines, and political bans, but kept their lives in nearly all cases. A member of the Capponi was beheaded in 1435 for political reasons; Piero de' Ricci and Amerigo Mazzei suffered the same fate in 1457. The only other execution of a political prisoner from the officeholding class in the period appears to have been Girolamo Machiavelli: exiled in 1458 and then captured in 1460 for conspiring against the regime, he died in custody, possibly as a result of torture.
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Part of the explanation for the relative resistance to the shedding of blood for political reasons in this infamously fractious city may come from the collective memory of the fourteenth century. The execution of political opponents had strong associations with past regimes that were perceived by the fifteenth-century office-holding class as tyrannical or illegitimate: the brief lordship of Walter of Brienne, the nominal Duke of Athens, from 1342 to 1343, and the guild regime of 1378 to 1382. In his Chronica, Giovanni Villani included the use of capital punishment by Brienne's 12 Baxendale, 726, 729. 13 Rubinstein, 1997, 2, 117, 37, 88-89; Ganz, 172, n. 49; Zorzi, 1993, 201 . Eleven of the Medici and their closest allies received sentences of exile between September 1433 and February 1434. Notably, proponents for the execution of Cosimo de' Medici in September 1433 met significant resistance from their peers. Seventy-three of the Albizzi and their supporters were exiled in October and November 1434. Three men were arrested, tortured, and exiled in August 1458 (Girolamo Machiavelli was one of these) and around 150 were confined to villas outside the city. The leading conspirators and their families from the failed coup of 1466, with the notable exceptions of Luca and Giovannozzo Pitti, all received sentences of exile in September of that year. government as one of the principal grievances of the city's elite against the duke. The chronicler described Messer Guglielmo d'Assisi, Brienne's bargello, as ''in truth his assassin,'' and recounted with graphic detail the death of Messer Guglielmo and his adult son at the hands of a mob ''of relatives and friends of those [he] had executed. '' 14 The guild-based government that was installed following the revolution of 1378 also executed six of its leading opponents in December 1379, and several others in the spring of 1381, for treason or conspiracy. 15 The oligarchic regime that seized power in Florence in 1382, first under the guidance of the Albizzi family and then under the dominance of the Medici, may have resisted using capital punishment in order to distinguish themselves from these earlier governments. While the Sienese ambassadors reported that fifteen people died during the upheavals surrounding the coup d'état of January 1382 that overthrew the guild regime, only three of these deaths occurred by execution: from its origins, then, the oligarchic reggimento of the fifteenth century appears to have avoided executing political opponents. 16 This reticence is all the more notable because this same government granted the Otto di Guardia (Eight of Ward), a magistracy originally charged only with powers of surveillance, the authority to render summary justice for crimes committed against the state.
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How the oligarchic regime positively defined itself -that is, beyond delineating what it was not -has greater significance in explaining its hesitation to execute political opponents throughout most of the fifteenth century. Competition, paranoia, and distrust characterized the society of Quattrocento Florence at the level of daily interactions and sociability, as men from all strata of the office-holding class struggled to maintain their status in the face of multiple and often conflicting ties of obligation.
18 However, at the ideological level -in the social imaginary of the office-holding class -the city operated very differently, as elite social identity intertwined with the republican constitution and its attendant civic 14 Villani, 4:18, 36 . 15 Brucker, 56-57; Najemy, 2006b, 171 . The records of the Compagnia de' Neri only begin in 1420, making firm figures for executions prior to this date harder to find: see Zorzi, 1993, 158, 162 . 16 Brucker, 60-62. It remains unclear whether the three executions referred to by the Sienese ambassador are those of Giorgio Scali on 17 January and the cloth-shearer Scatizza and a third individual on 20 January (which preceded the coup and related only indirectly to it) or to three additional executions.
17 See Brackett, 8-9; Zorzi, 1988, 37-39; Zorzi, 1992, 27-28 . 18 See F. W. Kent, 1994; Trexler, 9-43, 85-128; Weissman, 1982, 1-41; Weissman, 1989. humanist mythology.
19 During the fifteenth century the office-holding class conceived of Florence as an egalitarian fraternity of civilian magistrates. As chancellor of the city, Leonardo Bruni encapsulated this mythology in his 1428 funeral oration for Nanni Strozzi: ''Equal liberty exists for all . . . the hope of winning public honors and ascending [to office] is the same for all. . . . This, then, is true liberty, this equality in a commonwealth. '' 20 This myth endured under the Medicean regimes that dominated the republic for most of the fifteenth century. Almost half a century after Bruni, Matteo Palmieri (ca. 1405-75) observed that ''the state and foundation of every republic exists in civil union: to preserve this, it is necessary to maintain the citizen body and concord with equal justice. '' 21 The self-presentation of members of the office-holding class in paintings commissioned during the 1480s and '90s, such as the well-known frescoes by Domenico Ghirlandaio (1449-94) for Francesco Sassetti (1421-90) and Giovanni Tornabuoni (1428-97), also reflected and helped to construct this mythology (figs. 1 and 2). In both examples, portraits of contemporary figures dominate the sacred narratives. In The Confirmation of the Rule of Saint Francis ( fig. 1 ), the kneeling saint presents the rules of his order to Pope Honorius III in the right middleground. Behind them, the Piazza della Signoria of Florence is visible through a series of archways. In the foreground, physically separated from the sacred narrative by a railing, stand three groups of contemporary figures. On the righthand side, from left to right, stand Antonio Pucci, Lorenzo il Magnifico, Francesco Sassetti himself, and his youngest son Federigo, dressed in clerical garments. On the left, stand Sassetti's three eldest sons, while the sons of Lorenzo il Magnifico, accompanied by their tutors, emerge from an architecturally improbable staircase between the two groups. 22 In 19 I am using ideology here in the Althusserian sense of an imagined relationship between individuals and their conditions of existence that inflects all aspects of social and material life, rather than the classical Marxian notion of a false consciousness: see Althusser. Ibid. also influences my use of the term social imaginary to indicate the way that societies exist, not only in a material sense, in institutions and physical structures, but also in the realm of imagination, which often manifests itself in myths, legends, and ideologies, as well as other more prosaic ways (such as laws and history) that express the values and expectations of the society. On the social imaginary, see also Anderson; Baczko; Maza, [9] [10] [11] Baron, 419; see ibid., 556, for the original Latin text. See also Bruni's early fifteenth-century panegyric, the Laudatio florentinae urbis (ca. 1402), in which he describes the government of Florence as ''the action of the whole citizen body acting according to the law and legal procedure'': Kohl and Witt, 170. 21 Palmieri, 132: ''Lo stato e fermamento d'ogni republica è posto nella unione civile: a conservare questa è necessaria la compagnia et convenienza cittadinesca con pari ragione mantenere. '' 22 On the identity of the various figures, see Borsook, [36] [37] [38] Cadogan, The Annunciation of the Angel to Zacharias ( fig. 2 ), several members of Tornabuoni's extended family and their friends appear against a classically inspired background. By an altar at the rear, an angel announces the impending birth of John the Baptist to Zacharias. Just to the left stands a group of four men representing, from left to right, the three lineages that diverged from the ancestral line of the Tornaquinci: the chapel's patron, Giovanni Tornabuoni; Piero Popoleschi; Girolamo Giachinotti; and Giovanni's only surviving brother, Leonardo. To their left and right stand ranks of men, predominantly more members of Tornabuoni's family.
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The uniform appearance of male figures in such images, dressed in the red robes of public office-holders, promoted a sense of equality, even of selflessness, in public service, that underlay the ideology. 24 Matters of status are not absent from the frescoes, for example, note the careful positioning of the men in the Santa Maria Novella fresco ( fig. 2 ) in relation to the sacred narrative, the presence of Lorenzo il Magnifico in the Santa Trinita fresco ( fig. 1 ), and the variations in cut and color of fabric, the meanings of which are no longer apparent. 25 But the overall effect of the images is a sense of fraternity and inclusivity among those depicted. Palmieri speaks to this notion, asserting that every citizen elected to public office ''understands, before anything else, that he is not a private person, but represents the corporate body of the whole city. '' 26 This imagined community of civilian magistrates (the realities of socioeconomic inequities and the predominant influence of the Medici family notwithstanding) emerged in tandem with the political culture of consensus fostered by the oligarchic regime from the late fourteenth century. 25 Frick, 77-94, observes that Renaissance Florence was a ''cloth-sophisticated'' society in which minor variations in the grade and expense of fabric were legible and meaningful. 26 Palmieri, 131-32: ''inanzi a ogni altra cosa intenda non essere privata persona, ma rapresentare l'universale persona di tutta la città. '' Beginning in 1382, the elite cultivated a language of inclusion, consensus, and communal approval, even as they weakened the hold of the guilds and other corporate entities on the Florentine government and placed access to offices under increasingly tight electoral controls. 27 This culture of consensus, combined with the social imaginary of the office-holding class, provided a powerful disincentive to political executions. By the second decade of the fifteenth century, political conflicts between members of the elite no longer ended in bloodshed, but in the exile or banning of the losing parties. To have killed members of the defeated faction would have ruptured the fictions of community and consensus, the inclusiveness of the government. As temporary exiles or as disenfranchised residents, political opponents of the regime could always potentially enjoy reintegration into the commonwealth of citizens: they could rejoin the imagined community, resubmit to the manufactured consensus. 28 As political opponents they were misguided and mistaken, but still Florentine, still members of the office-holding class, and not enemies of the state, so long as they abided by the terms of their sentence.
The state in the republican period belonged in common to all members of the imagined community. It existed at the point of greatest convergence among the various individual, familial, and corporate interests that existed in Florence. 29 In this period, political conflicts occurred within the officeholding class over control of the state, but not over its nature. None of the opponents of the Medici intended a return to the guild-based corporate republicanism of the fourteenth century. Political opponents could be excluded from their share temporarily by a physical or political ban, but to remove them permanently would diminish the whole, making it vulnerable and threatening the mythology that held the republic together. 30 Only if an exile acted in such a way to remove himself from the commonwealth -by leaving the place of residence mandated in his sentence, or by conspiring against the Florentine government -would he face complete alienation. The regime declared such individuals to be rebels and placed prices on their heads.
The Florentine preference for exiling rather than killing the losing parties in internal political struggles was shared by other republican city-states in fifteenth-century Italy. In Bologna, where the political dominance of the 27 On the political culture of consensus, see Najemy, 1982 Najemy, , 2000 Najemy, , and 2006b . On office-holding and the politics of the period, see also D. Kent; Molho; Witt. 28 From the fourteenth century successive Florentine governments had pursued a policy of readmitting exiles in order to tackle the problems of fuoruscitismo, the threat posed to security by exiles, from banditry to full-scale invasion: see Ricciardelli, 29 My thinking about the nature of the Florentine state owes debts to Chittolini. 30 In the early decades of the oligarchy the threat of a restoration of the regime of 1378-82 remained a unifying factor: see F. W. Kent, 2002; Najemy, 1991. Bentivoglio mirrored that of the Medici in Florence, banishment remained the predominant punishment for the regime's opponents. The summary execution of some twenty-four men following the assassination of Annibale Bentivoglio (1413-45) in 1445 appears exceptional when compared to the later decades of the century. 31 While decidedly more prepared to shed blood than Florence, the Republic of Siena demonstrated a similar preference for exiling those defeated in the city's internecine conflicts. During the fifteenth century, hundreds of men were exiled from the city, sometimes on multiple occasions. Strikingly, political executions increased in frequency in Siena around the same time as in Florence, in the last two decades of the fifteenth century. But even during these turbulent years, the mass exile of opponents remained the predominant form of punishment meted out by the government.
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In Venice as well, the perception and administration of justice kept political executions rare and exemplary. The government did not hesitate to kill Venetian nobles convicted of serious attempts to overthrow the republican state, such as Doge Marin Falier (1285-1355), as well as non-Venetians from the city's empire condemned for similar reasons, such as the four Paduans hanged in December 1509 for supporting the imperial cause during the War of the League of Cambrai.
33 But such punishments remained exceptional. In general, Venetian justice operated with relative moderation, especially toward members of the nobility, and exile remained the preferred sentence imposed for crimes against the state.
34 Even in the perennially fractious Genoese Republic, internal conflicts remained relatively and surprisingly bloodless: for example, Paolo Campofregoso (1430-98), the city's archbishop and a prominent protagonist in its government, endured three separate sentences of exile in the space of thirty years. In 1461 and again 1483 he returned to become doge, before dying in Rome during his third banishment.
35 31 Robertson, [25] [26] [27] [28] [29] Mengozzi; C. Shaw, 2000, esp. 30-32, 42-52; C. Shaw, 2006, 15-92. Mengozzi, 386 , states that 127 political executions occurred in Siena between 1476 and 1490. As with Florence, this increase in the execution of political opponents appears to coincide with a shift in the nature of political conflict from one framed largely over control of the state, to one concerned with the nature of the state, as the Populari attempted to alter the traditional tripartite balance of power among the monti and to form what Shaw, 2006, 57 , calls ''one of the most self-consciously popular regimes of any Italian city in the fifteenth century.'' I am grateful to Jennifer Sliwka for the reference to Mengozzi. 33 On Doge Marin Falier, see Ruggiero, 1980, 3;  on the four Paduans, see Labalme and Sanguineti White, 124-25. 34 On the treatment of nobles under Venetian law, see Ruggiero, 1980, 69-70; J. Shaw, 6 . On the relative infrequency of political executions and the preference for exile, see J. Shaw, 213; C. Shaw, 2000, 33-36. 35 C. Shaw, 2000, 13-16. In Florence the change in leadership from Piero di Cosimo de ' Medici (1416-69) to Lorenzo il Magnifico in 1469 marked the first cracks in the politics of consensus and in the policy of exiling, rather than killing, political opponents. Lorenzo at least possessed the appearance of more direct power, and wielded it in a more signorial manner than either his father or grandfather. 36 The increasing prominence that Luca Landucci's diary gives to the Medici (and to Lorenzo in particular) testifies to the more princely nature of the regime after 1469. Whereas the apothecary only gave one mention each to Cosimo il Vecchio (1389-1464) and his son Piero, in Lorenzo's lifetime Landucci began to record Medici family marriages, births, and other significant events. When Lorenzo died, the diarist hailed him as ''the most glorious man there was, possessed of greater wealth, state and reputation [than any other]. Everyone declared that he ruled Italy, and truly he had a wise head, and his every cause prospered.'' Such sentiments contrast starkly with the apothecary's simple summation of Cosimo il Vecchio as ''[a] great merchant, as he had businesses everywhere. '' 37 Under Lorenzo the nature of the Florentine government changed also. New magistracies and a semipermanent senate, the Settanta (Council of Seventy), usurped control of financial oversight, legislation, and foreign affairs from the traditional communal institutions. The business of the state also increasingly found its way to Lorenzo's handpicked agents and secretaries to a greater extent than previously, bypassing the civilian magistrates of the republican system. 38 36 On the difficulty of assessing the extent of Lorenzo's actual power and his successful manipulation of the gap between appearances and reality, see Bullard, 1994 and 1998. McLean, 106-14, 128 , has recently tracked the increasing deference, and the deployment of a language of servitude and obligation, in letters to Lorenzo, compared to those written to his father and grandfather.
37 Landucci, 65: ''el più grorioso uomo che si trovi, e 'l più ricco e 'l maggiore stato, più riputazione. Ogniuno lo predicava che governava l'Italia, e veramente era una savia testa, e ogni suo caso gli riusciva bene''; ibid., 3: ''el gran mercante, ch'aveva le ragioni per tutto l'abitato.'' The difference between Landucci's judgments could be explained by his age, but I think his perception of the relative place of the two men has more significance. Landucci was twenty-eight when Cosimo died and was beginning to record the political life of Florence. Moreover, his reference to Cosimo comes in a listing of the city's most notable inhabitants: Landucci acknowledges Cosimo as a man of stature but only in commercial, not political, terms.
38 On the new institutions -the Settanta, the Otto di Pratica (Eight of Guidance), and the Diciasette Riformatori (Seventeen Reformers) -see A. Brown, 1992; Bullard, 1998; Rubinstein, 1966, 199-206 . The Otto di Pratica was a powerful committee responsible for foreign relations and military affairs. On the role of Lorenzo's private secretaries and agents, see A. Brown, 2002; Bullard, 1994, 65-79. As the Medicean regime became increasingly princely, the execution of political opponents revived. Initially, such deaths appeared to be in response to specific moments of crisis rather than as a general trend toward a signorial regime. Whatever the true extent of his power, Lorenzo il Magnifico maintained a conservative position in the city, situating himself within, not above, the imagined community and the culture of consensus. ''I am not lord of Florence,'' he observed in 1481 to one of his closest associates, ''but a citizen with certain authority, which I need to use with temperance and justification. '' 39 The cautious ambiguity of this declaration testifies to the extent to which the civic culture of the city remained a restraining influence on political executions. However, the return to such executions under Lorenzo suggests an emerging tension between exclusionary and inclusionary visions of the state that would endure for the next several decades.
In April 1470, Bernardo Nardi -who had previously been exiled for his role in the abortive coup against the Medici in 1466 -and several other men were executed following an attempted uprising at Prato. 40 Then in 1478 the Pazzi conspiracy against the Medici decisively shattered the calm of the preceding decades with an orgy of bloodletting. On 26 April, the conspirators attempted to kill Lorenzo il Magnifico, and successfully slayed his brother Giuliano (b. 1453), during High Mass in the cathedral. This action indicated a shift in the strategy of opposing the Medici, from political maneuvering to physical violence. However, the blood spilled in the cathedral during the botched double assassination was minimal compared with that demanded in retribution by the regime. In all, according to the records of the Compagnia de' Neri, eighty executions occurred between 26 April and 20 October 1478 as a result of the conspiracy. The eruption of bloodshed in 1478, first by the Pazzi conspirators and then by the Medicean regime, marked a discernable shift in the political culture of Florence. Execution became an option in internecine Florentine struggles over power, as these conflicts slowly became, not the simple realignments of power within the office-holding class that had occurred throughout most of the fifteenth century, but disputes over the very nature of the state. The republican political culture of consensus began to break down, and Florentine notions of state and government became more exclusionary. In 1433, Cosimo il Vecchio's opponents had him exiled along with several of his closest associates. When Cosimo and his allies returned the following year they responded in an identical fashion: exiling, not killing, their opponents. In 1466, when several leading members of the regime challenged Piero's succession to his father's predominant role in the state, the crisis resolved peacefully -despite the preparations for violence on each side -and once again the Medici's enemies suffered banishment rather than death. On both occasions the conflicts and challenges occurred largely within the public realm of office holding, by the election of nonMedicean executives and by attempts to remove the electoral controls and manipulations in the 1460s.
In 1478, however, the Pazzi conspirators did not wait upon the electoral cycle, nor did they attack the Medici via constitutional means. They attempted first to murder Lorenzo and his brother. The regime responded in kind, and with increased intensity. These actions speak to a culture of exclusion rather than one of inclusion: an emerging conception of the office-holding class as limited, as embracing not the entire fraternity of citizens, but only those approved of by either the Medici or their opponents (had the latter proved successful in the assassination of Lorenzo). 42 In such a conception, no room existed for the fiction of consensus and inclusion. Although this older political culture did not end immediately in 1478, the bloodshed of that year and the state executions in subsequent decades testify to a shift in the values and expectations of the office-holding class. The state, the victim of the crime, was increasingly viewed not as the common patrimony of the entire office-holding class, but of one segment of it.
The escalation of capital punishment for political reasons after 1478 provides a measure, not only of the extent of this change, but also of its pace. The execution of political prisoners between the Pazzi conspiracy and the implementation of the Medici principality in 1532 cycled between greater and lesser intensity. The periods when a Medicean regime controlled the republic -from 1512 to 1527 and from 1530 to 1532 -witnessed greater numbers of such deaths than non-, or even anti-Medici, reggimenti of 1494 to 1512 and 1527 to 1530. But whether dominated by the Medici or not, all governments after 1478 executed perceived and actual opponents. Notably, the beginning of this shift occurred in 1477, at the same time as the Otto di Guardia received official authority to investigate and punish any and all crimes, and as the number of professional foreign magistrates in Florence diminished to one: the podesta`, whose jurisdiction had dwindled to only private and civil issues. 43 The judicial structures of the city had become perfectly suited for partisan political manipulation. In this regard, the Florentine situation appears as part of a broader current in European history at the end of the fifteenth century, which saw an increasingly important role for the law in the defense of the state, and a tendency to erase earlier distinctions between types of dissent and to criminalize any political opposition under the umbrella of laesae maiestatis. 44 The frequency of political executions in both Siena and Ferrara, for example, increased during the late fifteenth century.
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After the last of the men associated with the Pazzi conspiracy were killed in June 1481, the records of the Compagnia de' Neri list no further political executions of Florentines from the office-holding class until after the coup d'état of November 1494 that expelled the Medici family. The hanging on 12 December 1494 of two prominent Medici agents and bureaucrats, Antonio di Bernardo Dini and Jacopo di Antonio di Meglio, represents the first two political executions of the new regime. However, the complicity of the two men in various financial crimes, and their not belonging to the office-holding class, make their deaths an imperfect measure of the changing political culture. The same can be said for the burning of Fra Girolamo Savonarola and two other Dominicans on 23 May 1498: although certainly political, the additional crimes of heresy, as well as their preexisting exclusion from the city's elite, lessened the politico-cultural impact of their deaths in terms of the current analysis.
However, the execution of Lorenzo Tornabuoni and his four fellow conspirators in August 1497, as well as the beheading of Francesco del Cegia for his support of the Medici on 18 December of the same year, do indicate the shifting political imaginary and culture of the Florentine elite.
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These men all belonged to the office-holding class and died for reasons of 43 Zorzi, 1988, 71, 77; Zorzi, 1992, 27-28, 35-40 . 44 See Sbriccoli, state. Their crimes were political: they belonged to and remained committed to the losing side in a struggle for power. For this they did not receive sentences of exile or restrictions on office holding, but death. Their allegiance to the Medici cause had cast them out of the elite community without hope of redemption. It indicated a different understanding of the state than that promoted by individuals within the current regime, dominated in 1497 by the political supporters of Savonarola. Francesco Valori, the leading figure of the frateschi, had become gonfaloniere di giustizia in January 1497. During his two-month term of office he persecuted perceived and actual supporters of the Medici, attempting to restrict their eligibility to sit on the Consiglio Maggiore (Great Council) and arguing for a conviction of rebellion against anyone who associated with Piero di Lorenzo and his brothers. He also spoke out strongly in favor of the execution of Tornabuoni and the others killed later that year.
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From 1494 until the institution of the Medici principality in 1532, the conflicts within the office-holding class became increasingly centered, not over control of the state, but over the nature of the state. The majority of the city's elite remained relatively nonpartisan in this struggle, valuing the preservation of their sociopolitical preeminence over any ideological commitments. 48 However, for the minority of committed partisans, particularly the avowed supporters of the Medici and their equally vehement opponents, the politics of consensus, while still a useful fiction, had become an obstacle to dominance. The executions in August 1497 indicate that a new political culture of exclusion that identified opponents as dissidents worthy of elimination was emerging.
Landucci's anguished reaction to the deaths of Tornabuoni and the others, however, indicates the limits of such an attitude in 1497. The vision that proscribed opponents as enemies to be exterminated rather than rehabilitated did not extend deeply or broadly among the office-holding class at the end of the fifteenth century. After the decapitation of Del Cegia no further political executions occurred until 1513. In general the officeholding class still held to a vision of themselves as forming an egalitarian community. Landucci's characterization of the 1497 executions as ''cruel'' 47 On Francesco Valori's political leadership of the frateschi and his actions in January and February 1497, see Jurdjevic, 19-45. On Valori's urging the execution of Tornabuoni and his co-conspirators, see Cerretani, Weinstein, 282. 48 A broad continuity among the ranks of office-holders across regime changes in 1494, 1512, 1527, and 1530 points to the non-alignment of most of the class in the political conflicts of this period. For detailed analysis of change and continuity in the office-holding class in 1512 and 1530, see Baker, testifies to the endurance of this imaginary and the continued reticence toward executions for political purposes. In a period when the violent punishment of criminals was normal, the distinction of cruelty from simple violence involved a moral judgment. A cruel act differed from a merely bloody one by its excessiveness, its inappropriateness. Moreover, within the realm of government, fifteenth-century Italians had inherited the classical association of cruelty with tyranny and political illegitimacy. 49 The sense of Landucci's words, then, was that for many Florentines the execution of men for political reasons was excessive, even illegitimate, and possibly tyrannical.
The imagined community of the fifteenth-century republic and the culture of consensus continued to endure even after the return of the Medici in 1512: no executions occurred in conjunction with the regime change.
50 Not yet titled princes, the Medici still valued preserving the image of Florence as a commonwealth of civilian magistrates. But this vision became increasingly strained. The tension between it and the emergent exclusionary understanding of the Florentine state lead to an increase in the rate of political executions after September 1512: eight during the fifteen-year Medici regime. Of these, four received death sentences for conspiring to assassinate members of the Medici family; the others died for reasons of state. The executions were also spread across almost the entire duration of the regime, from those of the would-be tyrannicides Agostino Capponi and Piero Paolo Boscoli in February 1513 to the beheading of Carlo Bonsi in February 1525. 51 The increased regularity of such executions provides a measure of the changing nature of the state in this period, and the increasing social distance between the Medici and the other leading families of the office-holding class.
Throughout the fifteenth century, the survival of the Medicean hegemony had depended on the maintenance of equilibrium between the predominant family and their oligarchic allies: indeed, the coup of November 1494 can be ascribed in part to the perception that the Medici had overreached their position. Although they never dominated the most significant offices of the commune in a manner commensurate with their actual influence, members of the Medici had consistently sat on various 49 See the illuminating discussion in Baraz, esp. 164-66. While not directly analyzing its usage, Dean, [53] [54] [56] [57] 71, 80, 82, 132 , also notes the correlation between ''cruelty'' and perceptions of excessive haste, force, or rigor by judicial officials. 50 The only political punishments made by the Medici on their return were the exile of the reigning gonfaloniere di giustizia a vita, Piero di M. Tommaso Soderini, and his four closest male relatives: ASF, Otto di Guardia della Repubblica, 230, 52 Lorenzo il Magnifico was too young to hold any of the most prominent political offices of the commune throughout his lifetime, but he sat on the Consuls of the Arte di Calimala in 1482 and 1487, served as an accoppiatore in 1471 and 1484, and served as an operaio (public works official) for several significant public buildings, including the Palazzo della Signoria.
53 After 1512, however, the Medici almost entirely absented themselves from public office. The two representatives of the family in Florence, Giuliano di Lorenzo (1478-1516) and Lorenzo di Piero (1492-1519), appear very rarely in the electoral records. Both men sat on the balı`a of 1512, the plenipotentiary council used by the Medici from the fifteenth century on to control the electoral and constitutional institutions of the city; and Lorenzo sat on the Settanta. But Giuliano never appears in records of the non-permanent offices, and Lorenzo sat only twice on the Otto di Pratica and once on the Cento (Council of One Hundred).
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The means by which Giuliano and Lorenzo avoided public office suggest the altered nature of the state after 1512. Lorenzo received a disqualification on four separate occasions for owing tax payments, and Giuliano was barred for the same reason the one time his name was drawn for office. 55 The two men probably did not owe any money to the commune at all, despite Lorenzo's repeated complaints that his allowance did not meet 52 The gonfaloniere di giustizia was the nominal head of the republic and the chair of the Signoria. The Sedici served as an advisory body to the Signoria; the accoppiatori controlled the electoral process. The various guilds of Florence, membership in which remained a prerequisite for citizenship and participation in public offices, had elected consuls responsible for the corporation's governance. 53 On the offices held by the three men, see Herlihy, Litchfield, Molho, and Barducci. On Lorenzo's role as an operaio, see F. W. Kent, 2004 his needs. 56 Rather, they used a handy mechanism to avoid undesirable and tedious offices. However, it also represented a significant change in the political culture of the Medicean republic and projected an image of separation from the office-holding class. In 1480, when Lorenzo il Magnifico (Giuliano's father and Lorenzo's grandfather) had actually failed to meet his tax debt, the regime went to extraordinary lengths to conceal the fact. 57 The leading men of the government worried more about the potential damage should Lorenzo be disqualified for office because of his weakened financial position than about his possible absence from the magistracies of the commune. His son and grandson's cavalier use of almost-certainly-fictional tax debts to shirk burdensome positions reveals a disconnection between the Medici and the rest of the office-holding class after 1512. If the two younger Medici did in fact owe money to the commune, their actions represent an even starker contrast to those of their fifteenth-century ancestors. The contortions of the regime in 1480 occurred because of a need, perceived by Lorenzo il Magnifico and his closest allies, for the Medici to appear as good and upstanding citizens, subject to the same rights and obligations as any other mature male of the office-holding class.
By contrast, in the 1510s the Medici, with the support of at least some of their partisans, had begun to distance themselves from the commonwealth of the republican imagination. They began to perceive the state more as their familial possession than as communal property shared with the other families of the elite: in other words, the Medici and their closest supporters cultivated a more overtly princely culture in the city. Officeholding, like taxpaying, was an obligation of a citizen, but not of a prince. The historian and statesman Francesco Guicciardini (1483-1540) observed that Lorenzo, following his election as Captain-General of the commune in the spring 1515, ''then removed his robe and assumed more military garb . . . today he is called more readily 'Lord Captain' than 'the Magnificent. ''' 58 Two weeks later, Guicciardini noted that Lorenzo had also acquired a following of twelve to fourteen young men ''who dressed like courtiers. '' 59 The wearing of the red robes of state had provided a visual analogue among 56 See, for example, ASF, Carte Strozziane, Serie 1, 3, 5 v . 57 A. Brown, 1992, 166-71 . Tax obligations appear to have been less of an issue for Lorenzo's father and grandfather, both of whom appear in the registers of the Tratte as being in arrears between 1436 and 1442: see Herlihy, Litchfield, Molho, and Barducci. It is tempting to hypothesize that this suggests the less signorial nature of the regime under Cosimo il Vecchio and Piero.
58 Guicciardini, 1987, 54-55 : ''Ha di poi lasciato el luccho et preso abito più militare . . . et si chiama hoggi più 'Signore Capitano' che 'el Magnifico.''' 59 Ibid., 58-59: ''che portano l'habito cortigiano.'' the office-holding class to the imagined fraternity of citizens in the 1480s. Changes in appearance bore great weight: a citizen wore a robe (lucco) but a prince wore armor. In the nascent signorial culture -manifested in these changes in appearance -political opposition became more than a factional struggle within the state, as conflicts in the fifteenth century had been, and turned into attempts to change the nature of the state, to deprive the Medici of their possession. The breadth of the gap between the expectations of the office-holding class and the behavior of the Medici, combined with the threat from Emperor Charles V (1500-58), then at war with Pope Clement VII (Giulio de ' Medici, 1478 ' Medici, -1534 , resulted once more in the expulsion of the Medici in May 1527. With the creation of another non-Medicean regime, political executions declined once more, as the city's political culture inclined away from the princely culture of the previous fifteen years. However, the four definably political executions that occurred between May 1527 and August 1530 represent a continuation of the trend of killing opponents. Two executions occurred for the now-ubiquitous reasons of state, another for passing information to the Prince of Orange, commander of the imperial army in Italy -following the byzantine turns of Renaissance diplomacy, Charles V and Clement VII had become allies soon after the expulsion of the Medici -and the last following a violent brawl between political rivals within the regime. 60 The significant minority of the office-holding class who had become completely opposed to the Medici had begun to visualize the state as the inverse of what it had been during the regime of 1512-27: as the communal possession of the citizens, but from which the Medici and their supporters were to be excluded permanently.
The most significant changes in the treatment of political opponents occurred after August 1530. From October 1529, Florence was besieged by an imperial army financed by Clement VII, and ordered by Charles V to return the pope's family to its former predominance in the city. Finally starved into submission, the Florentine government surrendered on 12 August 1530. The return of the Medici and their supporters to power proved a watershed in Florentine politics. Although the institutions of the principality were not legalized until April 1532, the republic effectively ended with the surrender. A wave of political executions accompanied the change in regime. Eight men were killed for reasons of state between August 60 BNCF, Palatino, 454, 8 v -9 r . Jacopo Alamanni was decapitated on 8 November 1528, ostensibly for starting a brawl in front of the Palazzo della Signoria. All contemporary observers reported that his death resulted from his conflict with the then gonfaloniere di giustizia, Niccolò Capponi: see Nardi, 2:140-41; Varchi, and December 1530, six of them among the most prominent office-holders of the previous government. 61 For the first time since the late fourteenth century, some members of the defeated regime immediately became enemies of the state and paid with their lives. These executions were brutal reminders that the conflict between the Medici and their opponents not only centered on control of Florence, but also on its political culture. The change of regime, therefore, required the immediate elimination of the preeminent proponents of the opposed model. Political executions continued regularly throughout the 1530s during the reign of Alessandro, the first Medici prince: two in 1531, two in 1533, three in 1534, three in 1535, and one in 1536.
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Contemporaries observed the increased frequency of political executions during Alessandro's brief reign. Among the new prince's opponents and the Florentine exiles, the bloodshed became indicative of the regime's illegitimacy. Similar to Landucci in 1497, but more overtly, these republican authors identified political executions with tyranny. Luigi Alamanni (1495-1556) condemns Alessandro as ''the most bloody and impious tyrant,'' accusing him of ruling ''with violent strength / with an armed and bloody hand. '' 63 Similarly, in his Apologia the Medici duke's cousin and assassin, Lorenzo di Pierfrancesco de ' Medici (1514-48) , describes Alessandro as ''no less cruel than Phalaris'' and condemns the duke for having men executed ''merely on the pretext of empty fears and words of no importance. '' 64 As the republic changed into a principality and the members of the office-holding class struggled to reimagine their roles as subjects and courtiers, those exiled for political reasons also became excluded permanently from the state. Like those executed, they too became enemies of the state, outsiders with whom no accord could be reached. The casting of rebels, men who had breached the bans imposed upon them by exile, as enemies of Florence was not new in the 1530s. The broad and indiscriminate use of such language to refer not only to open rebels but to all exiled members of the previous regime does appear as something new. The majority of the office-holding class that remained in Florence began to recast its onetime fellow citizens -men who had been friends, relatives, and The language of the letter speaks to the emergent political culture of the principality, in that Luigi identifies the person of the prince with the health of Florence, and the enemies of the Medici as threats to the security and stability of the city as a whole. His choice of poisonous to describe the nature of this threatimplying a noxious, outside corruption -emphasizes its external, nonFlorentine origin.
In late 1534, Francesco Guicciardini also underlined the growing divide between those within Florence and those without. About the exiles he writes, ''I have always judged that they have little foundation and that they proceed from madness and desperation.'' He adds that ''I know that I cannot trust these dishonest and malicious men, nor could anything persuade me otherwise. '' 66 Not only avowed supporters of the Medici principality such as the brothers Guicciardini, but also men indifferent, or perhaps even privately hostile, to the Medici used similar language. Lorenzo Strozzi (1482-1549), who held prominent offices between 1527 and 1530 and whose younger brother Filippo (1489-1538) had become one of the leading exiles, also articulated the distance between the office-holding class within Florence and those in exile, although not as strongly as the Guicciardini. In his correspondence with Filippo, Lorenzo continually invokes the obligations of a citizen to furnish the ''security and quiet'' of one's patria, rhetorically opposing the menace of war and turmoil posed by the 65 ASF, Carte Strozziane, Serie 1, 100, 61 v : ''la Ex[cellenti]tà del Duca dimostra più l'un giorno / che l'altro esse sopra la età sua patiente / intendere / et tutto''; ''perchè altro bene non possiamo havere / nè in altro consiste la salute di questa ciptà: essendo li inimici nostri più obstinate / et più velenosi che mai. '' 66 Ibid., 129, 202 r : ''ho sempre giudichato che habbino poco fondamento et che precedino da' pazzi et disperati''; ''so no mi posso fidar' di questi ribaldi nè cosa alcuna mai mi potrebbe persuader' il contrario.'' Guiccardini wrote this letter in June 1533, before the renewal of the exile sentences imposed in 1530, and thus before the majority of the exiles could even be considered rebels under Florentine law. For most of the exiles, the 1533 extension imposed a new place of exile, which provoked many to ignore the order, by which they automatically became rebels: see ASF, Otto di Guardia della Repubblica, 231, 140 v -147 r ; Nardi, 2:223-24; Varchi, exiles with the ideal state of peace that a ''loving and good citizen ought to desire. '' 67 Lorenzo argues that the exiles are not good citizens, nor do they deserve recognition as citizens at all, and that Filippo would do best to abandon their cause.
In January 1536, when the Florentine exiles appealed directly to Charles V to depose Alessandro de' Medici, Francesco Guicciardini represented the Florentine prince. Guicciardini's reply to the exiles contains a devastating representation of their exclusion from the social and political worlds of Florence. In this oration, Guicciardini divides the exiles into three categories, and summarily dismisses each one as no longer having a stake in the city. The first two groups, those who had voluntarily left Florence and Florentines with ecclesiastical professions -several cardinals played leading roles among the exiles -had willingly abandoned claims on the city and roles in its government. He saves his harshest language for the majority of the exiles, many of whom had become rebels by breaking their bans: ''If these complaints are proposed by rebels, we do not know how appropriate it is to hear them, as they can no longer be recognized in that fatherland, of which for their demerits they were justly and legitimately deprived.'' 68 The exiles, Guicciardini argues, were no longer Florentine at all. Political opponents of the Medici had become enemies of the state: foreigners with no recourse and with whom no settlement could be made.
The frequency of political executions from 1480 to 1560 peaked with Alessandro's successor, Cosimo I de' Medici: over one-third of all the executions in the period, twenty-two in total, occurred after 1537. 69 They did not occur with the same annual regularity that they had under Alessandro, but systematically in response to identifiable moments of resistance or opposition: eight men captured at the battle of Montemurlo, the military defeat of the Florentine exiles, were killed in August 1537; two further executions for the same reason took place in January the following year; three men who fought with the Sienese against Cosimo's annexation of the neighboring city were executed in September 1554; another in January 1556; three in May 1557; and four members of the so-called Pucci RENAISSANCE QUARTERLY conspiracy were executed in January 1560. The odd death was the solo execution and dismemberment of Giuliano Buonaccorsi, who had planned to shoot the Medici prince in July 1542 while he was hunting. The number of executions under Cosimo suggests the full development of a new political culture and notion of the state under the second Medici prince, the general conformity to these by the majority of the office-holding class, and the continuation of a significant minority of opposition from within the Florentine elite. By 1550, just before Cosimo embarked on his eventually successful campaign to conquer Siena, the political culture of Florence had achieved a definitively courtly aspect far removed from the civic culture of the fifteenthcentury republic. In the 1540s the city finally achieved a relative political stability after the swift succession of governments and regimes during the first four decades of the century. 70 The departure of imperial troops and the reclamation by Florentine soldiers in 1543 of all the Tuscan fortresses, occupied since the siege of 1529-30, marked diplomatic success for Cosimo and the achievement of relative autonomy from Charles V. Around the same time, the Medici prince defiantly began to sign himself as ''the Duke of Florence,'' despite never having received this title from the emperor, a testimony to Cosimo's increasing confidence and self-assertion. 71 The significance of Cosimo's usurpation of this title extended beyond his own selfconception and political identity to affect the social imagination of the Florentine office-holding class as well. It provided a stability and clarity to the constitutional structures of the city that the previous decade had lacked. It also demonstrated Cosimo's understanding and representation of his position as a reigning prince, as possessor and center of the Florentine state and government. Whatever the actual limits on his power and authority, Cosimo I imagined himself as an absolute prince. Within the sixteenth-century understandings of such a role, the prince was ontologically unquestionable: he was the law, the state, the possessor of everything already. To challenge or resist such a monarch became always and necessarily a crime against the state.
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Significant changes in the social imagination of the elite and its political culture accompanied these institutional shifts. Rather than the commonwealth of the republican imaginary, the state had become the possession of the prince. While fifteenth-century office-holders conceived of their role in terms of public service, those in the 1540s understood it as personal service to Cosimo I. The political collective that previously existed among the office-holding class became accessible only through Cosimo, whose person became the point of greatest convergence between the various individual and corporate interests of the city's elite. This new conception was recognized in the correspondence of magistrates with the prince. These men perceived success or failure in their official duties as a reflection of the virtue, honor, and standing of the prince. 73 In May 1537, while serving as the commissioner of the subject city of Arezzo, Domenico Martelli encountered resistance from the local police officials over the arrest of a would-be rapist. Martelli observed to Cosimo that if justice were not served the matter ''would not proceed with honor, neither Your Excellency's nor my own. '' 74 Similarly, in 1541 Girolamo degli Albizzi wrote from Castel Fiorentino to beseech the prosecution of a Florentine citizen who had attacked a member of the rural militia ''for your honor. '' 75 In 1543, Francesco Zati, as commissioner of Pisa, framed his enforcement of law in the subject city as ''in order to preserve the honor of Your Excellency. '' 76 This new reality was materially confirmed in 1540 when Cosimo moved his place of residence from the Medici family palace on the Via Larga to the Palazzo della Signoria. Previously the seat of the communal government, the Palazzo became the home of the prince as well as the center of his new administration. 77 The state as conceived in the republican tradition as the mutual possession of the office-holding class had become subject to Cosimo alone.
Beyond the frequency and systematic nature of the political executions carried out under Cosimo I, the manner in which such killings occurred also testifies to the new political culture of the principality. While the Pazzi conspirators who were executed in 1478 endured public and humiliating deaths, hanged from the windows of the Palazzo della Signoria, many of the executions for political reasons carried out between 1480 and 1542 happened out of sight. A sense of shame and the taint of the illegitimacy associated with cruelty and excessive bloodshed would appear to have 73 Compare the examples provided immediately below with the analysis of letters requesting political offices during the fifteenth-century republic, and especially the use of the word honor in such letters, in McLean, [94] [95] [96] [97] [98] 105, 25. 74 See Crum, 48. Compare Najemy, 2006a, 51-54. influenced this concern for secrecy. In addition to Lorenzo Tornabuoni and the conspirators of 1497, beheaded at night in the courtyard of the Bargello, twenty-five others executed in this period for political crimes died at the palace of the judiciary, witnessed only by the officers of the state.
78 By contrast, in princely states such as Ferrara during the fifteenth century, the execution of traitors, conspirators, and rebels became increasingly public, as a reaffirmation of the duke's authority. 79 The secluded nature of political executions in Florence contrasts starkly with the open and often humiliating deaths suffered by ordinary criminals such as Leonardo di Cosimo Carloni, who for robbery ''was sent to the scaffold with a placard before him [listing his crimes] and the mask [he wore while committing thefts], and he was hanged'' in 1507; or Gismondo di Battista, hanged in 1528 for blasphemy, who ''went [to the scaffold] in the cart with his tongue pierced''; or even Francesco Cioni, condemned for fraud in 1547, who was ''hanged in the Mercato Nuovo at a scaffold specially erected there. '' 80 More significantly, the concern for concealing political executions prior to 1542 contrasts with the public nature of such deaths in subsequent years. Of the twelve men who died for reasons of state between 1542 and 1560, all but two were killed in public spaces within the city: Alessandro di Piero Salviati was beheaded in the fortress of Livorno, and Pandolfo Pucci, leader of the conspiracy that bears his name, was hanged at the Bargello. 81 This change underlines the transition in political culture that had occurred. As Landucci had recorded in 1497, under the republic executions for political reasons were seen as illegitimate and excessive, but fears of illegitimacy do not appear to have restrained the government of Cosimo I. Putting to death an opponent of the Medici regime was no longer cruel, to borrow the apothecary's phrase once more, but 78 BNCF, Palatino 454, 8 r ; Rondini, 224. Zorzi, 1993, 194-95 , has argued that such concealment represents a concern for protecting the social status of the condemned in relation to the increasing aristocratization of Florentine society. The preference for the public execution of political criminals under Cosimo I, however, would appear to contradict this hypothesis.
79 Mazzi, [44] [45] 78, 112 , notes that only political criminals of a sensitive and potentially embarrassing status seem to have received private executions in Ferrara: for example, Niccolò di Leonello d'Este was decapitated at night inside the Castel Vecchio for his role in the attempted coup against his uncle, Ercole I. 80 Rondini, 226, 227, : ''fu mandato alle forche col cartello davanti e la maschera, e fu impiccato''; ''andò sul carro colla lingua forata''; ''Impiccato in Mercato Nuovo ad un paio di forche per tale effetto ordinate in quell luogo.'' On the importance of such elements for constituting ''a visual, aural, and performative system of a public nature,'' see Zorzi, 1993, 179-83. 81 Rondini, 231, 233. merely violent. Political executions had become legitimate in the new princely state of Cosimo I's Florence. In this new political culture the citizen magistrates of the republic became subjects and courtiers. The state no longer consisted of the community of the office-holding class, but of the person of Cosimo I. Resistance and opposition to the prince became opposition to the state itself, and vice versa. Punishment for such opposition could no longer simply be exclusion from the shared state, either by exile or by a ban on office-holding. All of the city's elite was excluded from the state already. They could access it only through the grace and favor of Cosimo. Instead, political opponents now faced more permanent erasure, by death or, in other cases, permanent imprisonment. The trajectory that had begun in the last quarter of the fifteenth century here reached its peak, the systematic execution of men for reasons of state. In the later sixteenth century, Cosimo's son, the Grand Duke Francesco, would extend the policy beyond his own territory and pursue a policy of assassinating his enemies abroad. The increasing incidence of political executions thus provides a very real metric for the shifting political culture of Florence in the early sixteenth century. The preference for exiling rather than killing opponents also emerges, in relief, as one of the defining features of Renaissance republicanism, not only in Florence, but across north-central Italy. This is the present-day Piazza S. Firenze. 85 This is the present-day Via de' Leoni. 
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